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CASENOTES
CORPORATIONS - SECURITIES LAW - DEFINITION OF SECURITY - FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS APPLICABLE TO
SALE OF A BUSINESS EFFECTUATED BY A STOCK SALE OF
ALL THE BUSINESS'S STOCK. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth,
105 S. Ct. 2297 (1985).
A father and his sons, managers and sole shareholders of a lumber
company,) sold the company to a tax attorney and a businessman. 2 The
sale was effected through a transfer of 100 percent of the lumber company's common stock. 3 The business did not live up to the purchasers'
expectations and eventually went into receivership. The purchasers filed
suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington alleging that the sellers violated the federal securities laws by misstating or omitting material facts relating to the prospects of the
enterprise. 4 The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject
1. Landreth Timber Co., a Delaware corporation, was purchased by Samuel Dennis, a
senior partner and tax attorney with a Boston law firm, and John Bolton, a former
client of Mr. Dennis and an experienced businessman. See Landreth Timber Co. v.
Landreth, No. 80-2-11740-8, slip. op. (W.D. Wash. Apr. 29, 1981), affd, 731 F.2d
1348 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 2297 (1985), reprinted in Appendix Accompanying Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 105 S. Ct.
2297 (1985).
2. The sellers, Ivan K. Landreth and his sons, owned all the outstanding stock of a
lumber business they operated in Tonasket, Washington. Landreth Timber Co. v.
Landreth, 105 S. Ct. 2297, 2300 (1985).
3. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 731 F.2d 1348, 1350 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S.
Ct. 2297 (1985). A business also may be transferred through the sale of a corporation's assets. This method, not coincidentally, escapes coverage of the federal securities laws. A sale of a business's assets is advantageous to the purchaser because he
can pick and choose the assets and liabilities he desires. A sale of stock, however,
results in the purchaser succeeding to all the assets and liabilities of a corporation,
known or unknown. A closely held corporation may keep a paucity of accurate
records and books; therefore, the purchaser of a corporation who purchases by a
sale of stock may not know precisely what he has acquired. A stock purchaser must
balance the greater risk of a stock transfer against the ease of the stock's transferability, whereas the asset purchaser may have to perfect his title in the many and
potentially eclectic interests of the business in question. See A. CHOKA, BUYING,
SELLING AND MERGING BUSINESSES 2 (3d ed. 1969); J. MCGAFFREY, BUYING,
SELLING AND MERGING BUSINESSES 1-6 (4th ed. 1979); W. PAINTER, CORPORATE
AND TAX ASPECTS OF CLOSELY HELD CORPORATION § 8.4 (2d ed. 1981). The
form of the transaction also may be dictated by the existence of nonassignable contracts or leases. Faced with this hurdle, the sale will be effected through a stock
transfer. For a painful example of the consequences of a nonassignable lease leading
to a stock transaction, see Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139 (2d Cir. 1982) (lease
decisive in the transfer of a ticket brokerage business by way of stock rather than
assets). For a discussion of the tax treatment of asset and stock purchases, see J.
MCGAFFREY, BUYING, SELLING AND MERGING BUSINESSES 139-52 (4th ed. 1979);
W. PAINTER, CORPORATE AND TAX ASPECTS OF CLOSELY HELD CORPORATION
§ 8.5 (2d ed. 1981). See generally Perry, Sale 0/ Assets Transactions: What are the
SEC's Disclosure Requirements?, 7 SEC. REG. L.J. 347 (1980) (discussing a "going
private" transaction and potential antifraud liability).
4. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 731 F.2d 1348, 1350 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S.
Ct. 2297 (1985).
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matter jurisdiction, holding that the sale of the business by transfer of all
the stock did not constitute a federal securities transaction; therefore, the
federal securities laws did not apply.5 The district court analyzed the
economic realities of the transaction and ruled the stock was not a security within the meaning of the federal securities laws because the buyers
did not enter into the transaction with the anticipation of earning profits
derived from the efforts of others. 6 The district court concluded, therefore, that the sale was not an investment transaction, but a commercial
or entreprenurial transaction.? The United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court decision. 8 The Supreme
Court reversed, holding that when a business is sold by the transfer of its
stock, the transaction is within the coverage of the Securities Act of
19339 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 10 (the Acts) because the
stock transferred constitutes a "security" as defined in the ActS.11
Comprehensive federal regulation of securities began with the enactment of the 1933 and 1934 Acts. In the wake of the 1929 stock market
crash, with investor confidence at an all-time low, Congress prescribed
the Acts as a means to eradicate the abuses of unregulated securities markets, to protect the unwary investor from fraud, and to bolster the investor environment. 12 The Acts have produced a statutory coalition
5. See Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth No. 80-2-11740-8, slip op. (W.O. Wash. Apr.
29, 1981), affd, 731 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 2297 (1985), reprinted in Appendix Accompanying Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 105 S. Ct. 2297 (1985).
6. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 731 F.2d 1348, 1351 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S.
Ct. 2297 (1985). For a discussion of the federal securities laws involved, see infra
notes 12-20 and accompanying text.
7. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 731 F.2d 1348, 1351 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S.
Ct. 2297 (1985).
8. [d. at 1353.
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77AA (1982) [hereinafter cited as 1933 Act].
10. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982) [hereinafter cited as 1934 Act].
11. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 105 S. Ct. 2297, 2303 (1985). For the definition
of security, see infra text accompanying note 18.
12. See S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1933), reprinted in 2 J. ELLENBERGER
& E. MAHAR, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, item 17 (1973) [hereinafter cited as ELLENBERGER & MAHAR] ([T]he report states that "[t]he aim [of this report] is to
prevent further exploitation of the public by the sale of unsound, fraudulent, and
worthless securities through misleading representation .... Confidence must and
may be restored upon the enduring basis of honesty with the public. "); PRESIDENT'S
RECOMMENDATION TO CONGRESS FOR FEDERAL SUSPENSION OF TRAFFIC IN INVESTMENT, SECURITIES IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE, H.R. Doc. No. 12, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933), reprinted in 2 ELLENBERGER & MAHAR item 15
([W]herein President Franklin D. Roosevelt stated: "This proposal ... puts the
burden of telling the whole truth on the seller. It should give impetus to honest
dealing in securities and thereby bring back public confidence."); see also Marine
Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 555 (1982) (1934 Act was "adopted to restore investors' confidence"); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976) (1933 Act
was "designed to provide investors with full disclosure of material information concerning public offerings of securities in commerce, to protect investors against fraud
and, through the imposition of specified civil liabilities, to promote ethical standards
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providing for the registration and regulation of securities. Absent an exemption, the offer or sale of a security as defined by the Acts is subject to
registration 13 with the Securities and Exchange Commission. 14 In addition the Acts contain antifraud provisions,15 including rule lOb-5, which
of honesty and fair dealing"); United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837,
849 (1975) ("[T]he primary purpose of the Acts of 1933 and 1934 was to eliminate
serious abuses in a largely unregulated securities market."); Tcherepnin v. Knight,
389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) (purpose of 1934 Act is "to protect investors through the
requirement of full disclosure by issuers of securities"); SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963) (Acts were to achieve high ethical
standards in securities industry). See generally James, The Securities Act of 1933, 32
MICH. L. REV. 624 (1934) (discussing the background of the Securities Act and its
key provisions); Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 29 (1959) (a glance backward at the legislative history of the
Securities Act by one of its key draftsmen); Loomis, The Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 214 (1959)
(discussing statutory framework of regulating the securities markets).
13. The 1933 Act requires the filing of a registration statement with the Securities and
Exchange Commission prior to the offer and sale of any security unless the security
or the transaction falls into one of the statutory exemptions. See Securities Act of
1933, § 5, 15 U.S.c. § 17(d) (1982). This registration process may be enforced by
three different remedies: private civil liability, id. § 77k-L; public civil equitable
remedies, id. § 17t(b); and public criminal action, id. §§ 17t(b), 17x. The 1934 Act
addresses the trading markets and provides that securities traded on a national exchange or held by more than 500 persons must be registered. See 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78L(b), 78(g) (1982).
14. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.c. § 77c(a)(I)-(8) (securities exempt from registration); id. §§ 17c(a)(9)-(II), 77c(b), 77d (transactions exempt from registration).
The first of the major statutory exemptions is the non public offering exemption of
section 4(2). Securities Act of 1933, § 4(2), 15 U.S.c. § 77d(2) (1982). This section
allows an issuer to sell unlimited quantities of unregistered securities provided the
offering is not public. Id. Section 17d(2) has been hailed as the most popular exemption of all. Thomforde, Relieffor Small Businesses: Two New Exemptions from SEC
Registration, 48 TENN. L. REV. 323, 325 (1981). The "safe harbor" rule for section
17d(2) is SEC regulation D, rule 506. 17 C.F.R. 230.506 (1985). Section 3(b) contains the second major exemption from registration. Securities Act of 1933, 15
U.S.c. § 17C(b) (1982). Congress empowered the SEC to promulgate limited exemptions to offerings up to five million dollars provided the public interest is served
and the investor is protected. The SEC in the spring of 1982 adopted a series of six
rules, known as Regulation D to fulfill its implementing powers. 17 C.F.R.
§§ 230.501-.506 (1985). Another major exemption is the intrastate offering exemption, embodied in section 77c(a)(Il). Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.c. § 77c(a)(II).
This exemption hinges on the offering being extended to only the resident of a single
state. Id. In adopting these exemptions, Congress believed that investors, in narrow
areas, required no protection of the registration scheme by reason of the small
amount involved or the limited character of the public offering. See H.R. REP. No.
1542, 83d Congo 2d Sess., reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 2973.
15. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 171(2), 17q (1982). These two sections comprise the antifraud provisions of the 1933 Act. Section 771(2) provides a cause of action for rescission or
damages against the seller using material misrepresentations in the offer or sale of a
security "whether or not exempted by the provisions of section (c) and (d)" (the
provisions exempting certain transactions or instruments). Section 77q is a general
antifraud provision prohibiting fraudulent devices or material misrepresentations or
omissions in the offer or sale of any security. The 1934 Act's antifraud rule, the
"workhorse" rule IOb-5, enacted pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
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prohibits material misrepresentations, omissions, and the use of fraudulent devices when the security is offered or sold. Significantly, these antifraud provisions apply with equal force whether the instrument is
registered or exempt. 16 As a result, although a security may be exempt
from the registration requirements, it remains subject to the antifraud
rules.
The Acts, including their plaintiff-oriented antifraud provisions and
federal jurisdiction, apply only if the transaction involves the transfer of
a "security" as delineated in the Acts. 17 Thus, the threshold inquiry in
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national security exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1985).
16. See Superintendent ofIns. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971)
("[W]e read § 1O(b) to mean that congress meant to bar deceptive devices and contrivances in the purchase or sale of securities whether conducted in the organized
markets or face to face."). Essential to understanding the ramifications of rule lOb-5
is that although the 1934 Act is concerned primarily with securities transactions
issued by publicly held corporations, rule lOb-5 clearly impacts on the closely held
issuer as well. See section lO(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.c. § 78j(b) (giving the SEC
an omnibus grant of authority to promulgate rules prohibiting fraud "in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange
or any security not so registered." (emphasis supplied)).
17. A plaintiff gains tremendous advantages when granted federal jurisdiction. The
1934 Act provides for exclusive federal jurisdiction, broad venue, and nationwide
service of process provisions. See 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1982). In addition, the elements
of the federal antifraud provisions are easier to prove than the elements of common
law fraud. L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 808-17 (1983)
(discussing the Acts' fraud provisions compared to common law deceit); W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 105-108
(5th ed. 1984) (discussing the tort action of deceit). A federal lOb-5 cause of action
is less severe; see, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972)
(reliance not a necessity in rule lOb-5 action); SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 193-95 (1963) (comparing common law fraud to the antifraud provisions of the Acts); Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir.)
(improper motive not necessary, just knowledge or recklessness), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 970 (1978); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en
bane) (no scienter needed), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971). But see Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (strict scienter requirement requiring intent to
deceive, manipulate, or defraud for violation of rule lOb-5). Recklessness as scienter
is still an open question; the privity element has survived and must still be proven in
a federal securities action. See Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d
Cir. 1952) (which requires the plaintiff to be a buyer or seller of securities); Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731 (1975) (approving the Birnbaum rule); see generally Long, Don't Forget the Securities Acts! 26 OKLA. L. REV.
160, 174-91 (1973) (summarizing the advantages of federal, as opposed to common
law fraud, as: (1) ease of proof; (2) greater damage recovery; and (3) extended
liability).
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determining the applicability of federal securities law is the interpretation
of the term "security." There is, however, no generic definition of the
term "security;" instead, the Acts define security in a laundry list fashion. Section 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933 defines "security" as
follows:
[U]nless the context otherwise requires - (1) The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture,
evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest on participation
in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit
for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas or other
mineral rights, . . . or, in general, any interest or instrument
commonly known as a "security," or any certificate of interest
or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt
for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or
purchase, any of the foregoing. IS
This definition includes well known instruments such as stocks, bonds
and debentures. The definitional section also contains less identifiable instruments such as evidences of indebtedness and investment contracts
which are referred to in catch-all terms but are intended to include "the
many types of instruments that in our commercial world fall within the
ordinary concept of a security."19 Moreover, because the Acts were intended to be remedial legislation to give investors equal footing with sellers, courts have interpreted the term "security" in an expansive manner
capable of adaptation to meet the "countless and variable schemes
18. 15 U.S.c. § 77b(l) (1982). The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 contains a definition that is virtually identical. See 15 U.S.c. § 78c(a)(IO) (1982). The legislative
history of the 1934 Act notes the definition was to be "substantially the same" as the
1933 Act. S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1934). A note with a maturity
of nine months or less, however, is a security for purposes of the 1933 Act but not
for the 1934 Act. Reufenacht v. O'Halloran, 737 F.2d 320, 327 (3rd Cir. 1984);
Exchange Nat. Bank of Chicago v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1131-32 (2d
Cir. 1976). As a result, a transaction involving such an instrument thus may create
antifraud liability under the 1933 Act, although there would be no liability for a
registration violation under the rule IOb-5 of the 1934 Act. Otherwise, the Supreme
Court has regarded the two definitions as being in pari materia. See Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 105 S. Ct. 2297, 2302 n.l (1985); Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455
U.S. 551, 555 n.3 (1982); United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 847
n.12 (1975); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 335-36, 342 (1967).
Despite the definitional sections of the Acts, what constitutes a security has
been perceived as "one of the best kept secrets in recent legal history. The Securities
Act of 1933 purports to define the term, but the definition itself presents a Pandora's
box of imposing dimensions." Hannan & Thomas, The Importance of Economic Realty and Risk in Defining Federal Securities, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 219, 219 (1974).
19. See United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 847-48 (1975); SEC v. W.J.
Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946) (citing H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess.
11 (1933».
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devised. "20
The Supreme Court has addressed the definition of a security on ten
occasions since the Acts' inception,21 but SEC v. W J. Howey CO.22 remains the definitive decision by the Court on what constitutes a "security." In Howey, the issue was whether the purchase of citrus groves
constituted an investment contract - an instrument enumerated in the
"security" definition.23 Florida vacationers were offered a strip of a citrus
grove together with a service contract for cultivation and marketing of
the fruit,24 Holding that the scheme constituted a "security," the Howey
Court isolated the elements of an investment contract as follows: (1) investment of money; (2) in a common enterprise; (3) with profits to come
solely from the efforts of others.25 This tripartite investment contract test
has come to be known as the "economic realities" test or "Howey" test
and it is the hallmark in determining whe~her a transaction involves an
investment contract. The Howey Court emphasized that to effectuate the
remedial federal securities laws, a workable formula was necessary: form
should be disregarded for substance, and emphasis should be placed
upon "economic reality."26
Twenty-nine years later, in United States Housing Foundation, Inc.
v. Forman,27 the Court addressed the amorphous definition of a security
in the context of stock. The plaintiffs in Forman resided in a nonprofit
housing cooperative. To acquire their apartments, the tenants were required to buy stock. 28 The residents sued the leasing company alleging
violations of the Acts' antifraud provisions. 29 The Second Circuit, applying a literal interpretation to the definition of a "security," had held that
20. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 848 (1975); SEC v. W.J.
Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946).
21. The ten cases are: Gould v. Ruefenacht, 105 S. Ct. 2308 (1985); Landreth Timber
Co. v. Landreth, 105 S. Ct. 2297 (1985); Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551
(1982); International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979);
United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975); SEC v. United Benefit
Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1967); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967); SEC
v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1959); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328
U.S. 293 (1946); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
22. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
23. Id. at 294.
24. Id. at 294-96. The SEC sought to enjoin the defendants from offering and selling
unregistered securities in violation of section 5 of the 1933 Securities Act. /d. at 294.
25. Id. at 298-99.
26. Id. at 298.
27. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
28. Id. at 842. Each purchaser had to buy eighteen shares of "stock" for each apartment
room in "Co-op City," a privately owned, state-subsidized, nonprofit housing cooperative in the Bronx, New York City, at a cost of $25 per share, resulting in a total
cost of $450 per room. Id.
29. Id. at 844-45. An "Information Bulletin" issued before construction began on "Coop City" projected that the average monthly rental cost would be $23.02 per room.
The cost of construction, however, increased dramatically due to inflation. The end
result placed the average monthly rental fee at $39.68 per room. Id. at 843-44. This
unpleasant tum of events prompted a class action suit by the tenants who alleged
misrepresentation via the "Information Bulletin." /d. at 844. Ostensibly, the tenants
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because the instrument possessed the label "stock," the instrument was a
security; therefore, the Acts' antifraud provisions applied. 30
On appeal, the Supreme Court held the stock was not a security and,
therefore, was not within the ambit of the federal statutes. 3l The Court
eschewed the Second Circuit's literal interpretation of the definition of a
"security."32 In so doing, the Court declared that "a thing may be within
the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within
its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers. "33 The Court held that
because Congress spumed a literal approach to the Acts' application,34
the applicability of the Acts turns on the "economic realities" underlying
a transaction. 3s Hence, although the Forman instrument was labelled
stock, the instrument lacked the requisite characteristics associated with
traditional stock. 36 The Supreme Court identified the characteristics of
stock to include the right to receive dividends contingent upon an appor-

30.
31.
32.

33.

34.

35.
36.

were led to believe that future cost increases would be absorbed by the developers.
Id.
Forman v. Community Services, Inc., 500 F.2d 1246, 1252 (2d Cir. 1974), rev'd sub
nom. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 859-60 (1975).
Id. at 848. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Forman held that the
shares of stock were commensurate with "securities" and based its decision on two
alternative grounds, which later constrained the Supreme Court to deal with the
question in similar fashion. First, the intermediate appellate court held that because
the shares purchases were denominated "stock," the literal application of the "security definition" invoked coverage of the federal securities laws. Forman v. Community Services, Inc., 500 F.2d 1246, 1252 (2d Cir. 1974), rev'd sub nom. United
Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975). Second, the court of appeals
labeled the transaction an "investment contract" as delineated by the Howey test.
Id. at 1253-55. The Supreme Court likewise rendered its decision in several parts.
Part I set out the detailed but simple fact pattern. See United Hous. Found., Inc. v.
Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 840-47. Part II was devoted to the definition of a "security"
as delineated by the Acts. Id. at 847-48. Part IIA contains the Court's rejection of a
literal approach to the definition. Id. at 848-51. More importantly, as Landreth
would later stress, the Court found the "stock" to be titular: the instrument manifested none of the essential attributes of inveterate, conventional stock. Id. at 84851. Part lIB contained the Court's discussion of whether the instrument could
march through the Howey "investment contract" test. Id. at 851-58. The Forman
decision has not enjoyed a uniform interpretation. See infra note 45 for the consequences of Forman's bifurcated analysis.
Id. at 849 (quoting Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459
(1892)); see also United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543
(1940) ("[E]ven when the plain meaning [of a statute] did not produce absurd results but merely an unreasonable one 'plainly at variance with the policy of the
legislation as a whole' this Court has followed that purpose, rather than the literal
words." (citations omitted)).
Id. at 849. Congress sought to define the term "security" in the 1933 Act "to include ... the many types of instruments that in our commercial world fall within
the ordinary concept of a security." H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. II
(1933).
United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 848, 851-52 (1975). This principle was utilized earlier in Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967), and
SEC v. W.J. Howey, 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946).
United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 851 (1975). Although the instrument in Forman was called stock, it prohibited transferability, conferred no vot-
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tionment of profits, negotiability, the ability to be pledged or hypothecated, the conference of voting rights in proportion to the number of
shares owned and the capacity of the stock to appreciate in value. 37 Having concluded the instrument in question was not typical "stock," the
Forman Court then addressed whether the instrument was an investment
contract. The Court resorted to the Howey test, which "embodies the
essential attributes that run through all of the Court's decisions defining
a security."38 The Court then proceeded to apply the Howey test 39 to the
Forman instrument, because in this transaction the Court could perceive
no distinction between the stock and an investment contract. 40 The
Court found that the transaction was entered into without an expectation
of profits from the efforts of others, thus it did not satisfy the Howey test.
Consequently, the Court ruled that when a purchaser is motivated by a
desire to use, consume, or develop that which he acquires, the purchase is
not an investment, but a commercial transaction which fails to activate
the protections of the Acts' antifraud provisions. 41
Forman's application of the Howey economic realities test to stock
formed the fundamental precept to the sale of business doctrine. The sale
of business doctrine would deny the protection of the federal securities
laws to parties buying and selling common stock to obtain control of a
corporation. The rationale of the doctrine is that when a business
changes hands through the sale of a controlling block of its stock, that
stock is not a security within the contemplation of the Acts.42 Courts

37.
38.
39.

40.
41.

42.

ing rights, and provided no opportunity for dividends or profit upon resale. Id. at
851.
Id. at 851.
United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975). That test is the
"economic realities" test promulgated in SEC v. W.J. Howey, 328 U.S. 293, 301
(1946).
See United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975). The Court stated:
"The touchstone is the presence of an investment in a common venture premised on
a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others." Id. at 852.
The Forman Court revised the Howey test in two ways. The first part of the
Howey test calls for an "investment of money." Howey, 328 U.S. at 301. Forman
reconstructed this prong to include simply an "investment." Forman, 421 U.S. at
852. The third part of the Howey test required an inquiry into whether the transaction involved "profits solely from the efforts of others." Howey, 327 U.S. at 301
(emphasis added). Forman, however, altered the phrase by jettisoning the word
"solely." Forman, 421 U.S. at 852. The efficacy of this alteration allows a purchaser
to contribute some effort to generate profits without losing the label investor, as long
as the purchaser's efforts were not too significant. It is clear that even the reconstructed Howey test requires the plaintiff to show the promoter's or a third party's
efforts, instead of his own, were the linchpin to the success of the venture. Forman,
421 U.S. at 852.
See United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975). The stock lacked all
traditional characteristics except the name "stock." Id. at 851.
Id. at 858.
See, e.g., Christy v. Cambron, 710 F.2d 669 (10th Cir. 1983) (sale of a controlling
interest in a discotheque effected through transfer of stock was not a securities transaction); Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1982) (sale of radio station not
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embracing this view spurned a literal interpretation of the definition of
security and, in effect, created an exclusion from the coverage of the federal securities laws. The doctrine was applied for the first time in Chandler v. Kew, Inc.,43 decided twenty months after Forman. In Chandler,
the aggrieved buyer acquired a liquor store by purchasing 100 percent of
the stock from its owners. The Tenth Circuit focused on the substance of
the transaction, which was the sale of the liquor store, and concluded
that the economic realities barred the application of federal securities
laws because the stock was merely an indicia of ownership.44 The Chandler decision, as progenitor, prompted other federal courts to hold that in
the conventional sale of a business, which involves the transfer of both a
business and all of its stock, fundamentally the buyer acquires a business
and only acquires the stock as indicia of ownership.45
Courts that initially adopted the "sale of business doctrine" interpreted the Forman case to mean that the sole criterion of whether stock
is a security is the transaction's satisfaction of the Howey economic realities test. 46 These courts held that Forman extended the Howey test to
include all instruments within the definition of security,47 thereby al-

43.
44.
45.
46.

47.

within the coverage of federal securities laws); King v. Winkler, 673 F.2d 342 (II th
Cir. 1982) (sale of heating and air conditioning business not a securities
transaction).
691 F.2d 443 (10th Cir. 1977).
Id. at 444.
Chandler was important because it implicated Howey and Forman, both of which
served as the basis for the substantial, but now short-lived Chandler progeny. See
infra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Christy v. Cambron, 710 F.2d 669, 672 (10th Cir. 1983) ("[T]he economic
realities of the case at bar show that plaintiffs were buying a discotheque, and there
is no question about that."); King v. Winkler, 673 F.2d 342, 345 (11th Cir. 1982)
("[b]ased on the rationale of Forman, we reject a literal test and hold that the 'economic realities' test is appropriate to determine whether a transaction involving
stock in a corporation is a 'security transaction' or an 'investment contract' governed by the Federal Securities Acts."); Frederiksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147,
1151 (7th Cir.) ("[t]he Forman Court applied an 'economic reality' analysis [to determine] the scope of federal securities laws."), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1981).
See, e.g., Christy v. Cambron, 710 F.2d 669, 672 (10th Cir. 1983) ("[t]he attribute of
a security is that it represents an investment in a venture which derives profits from
the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others." (emphasis in original»; Canfield
v. Rapp & Son, Inc., 654 F.2d 459,465 (7th Cir. 1981) ("economic reality" is always the key issue in determining whether stock is a security). Cases rejecting the
doctrine interpret Forman entirely differently. According to these courts, Forman
applied a two-part seriatim test; they reason that the Forman Court turned to the
Howey investment contract test only after assessing that the transaction involved
aberrant stock. Consequently, if conventional stock is transferred, then the Howey
test is preempted. See, e.g., Daily v. Morgan, 701 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1983); Golden
v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139 (2d Cir. 1982); Coffin v. Polishing Machine, Inc., 596
F.2d 1202 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979); infra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
Courts faced with the issue to accept or reject the sale of business doctrine
invariably turn to Forman for guidance. The ubiquitous Forman opinion can be
found in every federal opinion deciding the issue. See Easley, Recent Developments
in the Sale of Business Doctrine: Toward a Transactional Context Based Analysisfor
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lowing the Howey test to engulf the definition of security. Aggrieved buyers of businesses thus invariably failed the Howey economic realities test
because profits would not flow from the efforts of others but instead
would be derived from the buyer's own efforts. 48 Moreover, these courts
drew a line of demarcation between a commercial or entrepreneurial
transaction and one made for investment purposes. 49 Buyers who profited from their own efforts were not investors but entrepreneurs. 50 Courts
Federal Securities Jurisdiction, 39 Bus. LAW 929, 933 (1984). One commentator has
stated that the role of Forman in the sale of business mileau has been reduced to
ammunition in a "quotation contest." Seldin, When Stock is Not a Security: The
"Sale of Business" Doctrine under the Federal Securities Laws, 37 Bus. LAW. 637
(1982). Language in Forman supports both sides of the "sale of business doctrine"
dispute. For instance, the Court stated" '[i]n searching for the meaning and scope
of the word "security" in the Act[s], form should be disregarded for substance and
the emphasis should be on economic reality.' " United States Hous. Found., Inc. v.
Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 848 (1975) (quoting Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336
(1967». Sale of business doctrine advocates find solace in the Court's discussion of
the Acts' purpose where it is stated, "[b]ecause securities transactions are economic
in character Congress intended the application of these statutes to tum on the economic realities underlying a transaction, and not on the name appended thereto."
[d. at 849. In discussing the difference between an "investment contract" and an
instrument commonly known as a "security," the Court stated that, "[i]n either
case, the basic test for distinguishing the transaction from other commercial dealings is the Howey test." [d. at 852. The Court then stated: "This test, in shorthand
form, embodies the essential attributes that run through all of the Court's decisions
defining a security." /d. Conversely, those rejecting the doctrine can also tum to
Forman wherein the Court states:
In holding that the name given to an instrument is not dispositive, we do
not suggest that the name is wholly irrelevant to the decision whether it is
a security. There may be occasions when the use of a traditional name
such as "stocks" or "bonds" will lead a purchaser justifiably to assume
that the federal securities laws apply. This would clearly be the case when
the underlying transaction embodies some of the significant characteristics
typically associated with the named instrument.
[d. at 850-51.
48. See, e.g., Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 731 F.2d 1348, 1353 (9th Cir. 1984),
(court unable to find a third-party upon whose efforts the purchaser relied for its
profit within the meaning of Howey) rev'd on other grounds, 105 S. Ct. 2297; King v.
Winkler, 673 F.2d 342, 344 (11th Cir. 1982) (requirement that profits be derived
from efforts of others not satisfied as aggrieved buyer took over management of the
business); Canfield v. Rapp & Son, Inc., 654 F.2d 459, 463-64 (7th Cir. 1981)
(buyer, upon purchase, took over management of the company making the buyer
and the company indistinguishable).
49. Eg., Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197,203 (7th Cir. 1982) (establishing a presumption
of entrepreneurial intent when buyer acquires more than 50% of a corporation's
stock making Acts inapplicable); King v. Winkler, 673 F.2d 342, 344-45 (II th Cir.
1982) (profit emanating from entrepreneurial efforts of buyer renders Acts inapplicable); Fredericksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147, 1148, 1152-53 (7th Cir.) (Act does
not apply where purchaser places money in hands of another who will control the
funds and the business decisions), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1981); see also,
Thompson, The Shrinking Definition of a Security: Why Purchasing All of a Company's Stock is Not a Federal Security Transaction, 57 N.Y.U.L. REV. 225, 240
(1982) (arguing that although a purchaser of all of the stock of a business is making
an investment, it is not the type of transaction intended to be covered by the Acts).
50. See Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 731 F.2d 1348, 1352 (doctrine's foundation
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accepting the doctrine reasoned that Congress designed the federal securities laws to protect investors unable to fend for themselves, rather than
purchasers who subsequently manage the enterprise. 51 This contention is
buttressed by a reading of the legislative history behind the Acts which is
silent as to those sophisticated buyers who obtain control of a corporation by purchase of the corporation's stock. 52
In Marine Bank v. Weaver,53 the Court injected an additional rationale in support of the sale of business doctrine. At issue in Marine
Bank was whether a bank certificate of deposit and a profit-sharing
agreement were securities. 54 Regarding the certificate of deposit, the
Court acknowledged that the instrument was among those enumerated in
the definition of securities provided in the Acts,55 but relied upon the
qualifying language prefacing the definition - "unless the context otherwise requires" - to exclude the instrument from the definition of a security.56 The Court examined the context under which the certificate of
deposit was issued and determined that the holders of this instrument did
not require the protection of the federal securities laws. 57 Thus, the
Marine Bank Court, similar to courts adopting the sale of business doctrine, rejected a strict literalist interpretation of "security" and relied on
the caveat in the Act's definition to exclude the instrument. 58
The Marine Bank case, finding that the prefatory language required
a holding that an instrument enumerated in the statute may not necessarily be a "security," seemed to settle the judicial dialogue concerning the
significance of the phrase, "unless the context otherwise requires."

51.
52.
53.
54.

55.
56.

57.

58.

based on predicate that Acts apply to investment transactions, not entrepreneurial
transactions), rev'd on other grounds, 105 S. Ct. 2297 (1985); Sutter v. Groen, 687
F.2d 197, 201 (7th Cir. 1982) (same).
See Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1982); infra note 108.
See Sutter v. Groen, 678 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1982).
455 U.S. 551 (1982).
Id. at 552. The plaintiffs purchased this instrument from the bank. Subsequently,
they pledged it back to the bank as collateral for another customer's loan made by
the bank to a slaughterhouse company. Id. at 552-53. As consideration for the guarantee on the loan the plaintiffs entered into a profit-sharing agreement with the owners of the slaughterhouse giving the plaintiffs the right to receive 50% of the net
profits of the meat packer and $100.00 per month for the life of the guarantee. Also,
the plaintiffs were granted the right to use the company's barn and pasture in addition to the right to limit the company's future borrowing. Id. at 553.
Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 556 (1982).
See id. at 556, 558-59. The import of the Marine Bank decision, like every other
aspect of the sale of business doctrine, has been hotly debated. It has been interpreted as rejuvenating the spirits of doctrinal proponents. See Ribskin, Securities
Regulation, 34 MERCER L. REV. 1461, 1484 (1983); Note, Function Over Form: The
Sale of Business Doctrine and the Definition of "Security," 63 B.U. L. REV. 1129,
1146 (1983). But see Kerjala, Realigning Federal and State Roles in Securities Regulation Through The Definition of a Security, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 413, 430-35.
455 U.S. at 558-59. In finding the context otherwise required, Marine Bank emphasized that the plaintiff was not entitled to federal securities coverage because certificates of deposit are sufficiently protected by a comprehensive scheme of regulation
under the federal banking laws. Id. at 559.
Id. at 556, 558-59.
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Marine Bank interpreted the phrase to require an inquiry into the context of the circumstances surrounding the instrument, not the context of
the statute. 59 This reading of the phrase enabled the Court to exclude the
certificate of deposit from the securities laws by examining the transaction's economic realities. Thus, proponents of the sale of business doctrine began to rely on Marine Bank's interpretation of the phrase to
signal that courts should examine the economic context of every transaction, even though the instrument may be expressly enumerated in the
"security" definition. This construction of Marine Bank furthered the
view that, although stock is enumerated in the statutory security definition, it may not be a security if the context of the transaction indicates
otherwise. 60
Additionally, the Marine Bank Court ruled that the profit-sharing
agreement, also explicitly within the statutory definition of security, was
not a security because the agreement did not satisfy the Howey test. 61 The
Court discussed the "common enterprise" element of the Howey test and
found that instruments accorded security status in earlier Supreme Court
cases were harmonious in that each had been offered to a large number of
investors. 62 Because the agreement was really a private transaction it was
59. Prior to Marine Bank, a dispute centered on whether the word "context" referred to
the underlying context of the transaction or the context of other sections of the
Securities Acts. A restrictive view of the phrase read "context" to mean the statutory context. Thus, under this view, the definitions in the statutory language were
to govern unless the language surrounding the term elsewhere in the Act indicated
otherwise. See SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 459 (1969) (Congress
... cautioned that the same words may take on a different coloration in different
sections of the securities laws). By contrast, another view of the caveat has been
construed as a vehicle to examine the underlying circumstances of the transaction in
order to determine the applicability of the Acts. See Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197,
200 (7th Cir. 1982) (Referring to Marine Bank, the Seventh Circuit stated: "The
Court got around the seemingly uncompromising statutory language by treating the
word 'context' in the introductory clause of section 3(a)(1O) as having reference to
the economic as well as linguistic context."). In Marine Bank, the Court took the
certificate of deposit out of the "security" context because of the economic circumstances of the transaction: the purchasers were fully protected by the plethora of
federal banking laws. See Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 559 (1982). Courts
adopting the sale of business doctrine therefore used the caveat to the definition to
take stock, which is specifically enumerated in the statute, out of the statute. See
Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197, 200 (7th Cir. 1982) (intrepreting Marine Bank's
"context" discussion as referring to the economic context of the transaction);
Frederiksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir.) (relying on "context" aspect
of definition to restrict scope of Acts), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1981).
60. See Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1982); see also Easley, Recent Developments in the Sale of Business Doctrine: Toward a Transactional Context Based Analysis for Federal Securities Jurisdiction, 39 Bus. LAW 929 (1984) (arguing that
Marine Bank's "context" discussion mandates that all factors and risks of the transaction be examined to define Acts' scope).
61. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 559-60 (1982).
62. Id. at 559. The control element of the Howey test, the "efforts of others," was also
discussed in Marine Bank in relation to the profit sharing agreement. The "efforts of
others" element was not satisfied because the plaintiff retained the right to veto
future loans and, thus, maintained a measure of control. Id. The Marine Bank
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"not the type of instrument that comes to mind when the term 'security'
is used."63 The Court therefore lent credence to the notion that the
Howey test is applicable not only when examining the characteristics of
uncommon instruments, but also when examining the characteristics of
common instruments enumerated within the statutory definition of security. Moreover, the Court admonished that courts must analyze and
evaluate each transaction upon the content of the instrument, the purposes of the Acts, and the peculiar facts of each case.64 The Court buttressed its conclusions by stating that "Congress, in enacting the
securities laws, did not intend to provide a broad federal remedy for all
fraud."65 Of even greater import to sale of business proponents was the
Court's refusal to label the agreement a security because it was the fruit
of a private transaction. 66 Significantly, the sale of a closely held business
is usually the result of arms-length negotiations between the parties, also
a private transaction.
Within the eight years prior to Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth,67
the federal circuits were divided on the viability of the sale of business
doctrine. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh,68 Ninth,69
Tenth,70 and Eleventh71 Circuits followed the doctrine. Conversely, the
Second,72 Third,73 Fourth,74 Fifth,75 and Eighth 76 Circuits rejected the
profit-sharing agreement, termed a "unique agreement," was not traded publicly but
was negotiated privately. Id. As a result, the plaintiffs were given no prospectus and
the agreement was not designed for public trading and was "not the type of instrument that comes to mind when the term 'security' is used and does not fall within
the 'ordinary concept of a security.' " Id. at 559.
63.Id.
64. Id. at 560 n.ll. The Court stated:
It does not follow that a certificate of deposit or business agreement between transacting parties invariably falls outside the definition of a "security" as defined by the federal statutes. Each transaction must be analyzed
and evaluated on the basis of the content of the instruments in question. the
purposes intended to be served. and the factual setting as a whole.
Id. (emphasis supplied).
65. Id. at 556.
66. Id. at 559-60.
67. 105 S. Ct. 2297 (1985).
68. See Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197, 199-204 (7th Cir. 1982); Canfield v. Rapp & Son,
Inc., 654 F.2d 459, 465 (7th Cir. 1981); Frederiksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147,
1151-52 (7th Cir. 1981).
69. See Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 731 F.2d 1348, 1353 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd,
105 S. Ct. 2297 (1985).
70. See Christy v. Cambron, 710 F.2d 669, 672 (10th Cir. 1983).
71. See Kaye v. Pawnee Const. Co., 680 F.2d 1360, 1366 n.2 (11th Cir. 1982); King v.
Winkler, 673 F.2d 342, 344-46 (11th Cir. 1982).
72. See Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139, 1140-47 (2d. Cir. 1982).
73. See Ruefenacht v. O'Halloran, 737 F.2d 320 (3rd Cir. 1984); Glick v. Campagna,
613 F.2d 31,35 (3rd Cir. 1979).
74. See Coffin v. Polishing Machines, Inc., 596 F.2d 1202, 1204 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 868 (1979); Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Pat Ryan & Assocs., Inc., 496 F.2d
1255, 1261 (4th Cir. 1974).
75. Daily v. Morgan, 701 F.2d 496, 497-504 (5th Cir. 1983).
76. See Cole v. PPG Indus., Inc., 680 F.2d 549, 555-56 (8th Cir. 1982). For cases re-
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sale of business doctrine, treating stock as a security for purposes of the
Acts without questioning the transactions' economic realities.
Whether the sale of stock of a closely held corporation was a securities transaction subject to the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws was presented to the Supreme Court in Landreth Timber Co. v.
Landreth. 77 The Court held that if an instrument bears the label "stock"
and possesses the requisite characteristics associated with stock,78 a court
may not go beyond the character of the instrument and analyze the economic substance of the transaction. 79
The Court noted that, by the very language of the statute, stock is
within the definition of a security enumerated in the Acts.80 Consequently, most instruments affixed with the title "stock" are likely to be
covered by the definition. The Court acknowledged that coverage by the
Acts is not invoked merely because the instrument bears the label
"stock," but that a further determination also must be made as to
whether the instrument possesses the five elements traditionally associated with stock. 81 The Court concluded that if an instrument is called
stock, and possesses the characteristics associated with stock, then a purchaser of a business may assume that the instrument is a security to
which federal securities laws apply.82 It was undisputed that the stock
transferred in Landreth possessed all the characteristics traditionally associated with stock. 83 The Court therefore concluded that "the stock at
issue here is a 'security' within the definition of the Acts, and the sale of
business doctrine does not apply."84
The Court distinguished United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman 8S by observing that the stock in Forman possessed none of the typical characteristics of conventional stock. 86 Thus, in Forman the Court
went on to consider whether the instruments were "investment contracts" pursuant to the Howey test. 87 The Court's application of the
Howey test in Forman led to the conclusion that the economic substance
of the transaction, to secure inexpensive housing, was not the type of

77.
78.
79.

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

87.

jecting the doctrine at the district court level, see Sterling Recreation Org. Co. v.
Segal, 537 F. Supp. 1024, 1026-27 (D. Colo. 1982); Mifflin Energy Sources, Inc. v.
Brooks, 501 F. Supp. 334, 336 (W.D. Pa. 1980); Titsch Printing, Inc. v. Hastings,
456 F. Supp. 445, 449 (D. Colo. 1978); Bronstein v. Bronstein, 407 F. Supp. 925,
930 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
105 S. Ct. 2297 (1985).
For a list of these characteristics, see supra note 36.
105 S. Ct. at 2302-03.
Id. at 2302.
Id.
Id. at 2303.
Id. at 2302-03.
Id. at 2308.
421 U.S. 837 (1975).
Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 105 S. Ct. 2297,2302-04 (1985); see supra notes
32-33 and accompanying text.
Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 105 S. Ct. 2297, 2304 (1985).
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investment contemplated by the Acts. 88
The Court acknowledged that its previous attempts to define "security" had "not been entirely clear. "89 This was, however, because its prior
inquiries into the underlying economic substance of the transactions were
necessitated by the unusual characteristics of the "securities" involved. 9o
But the Court noted that the Howey test remains a viable method to determine if stock is a security, provided the instrument fails to possess the
traditional characteristics of stock. 91 The Howey test is inappropriate,
however, if used to determine whether a particular instrument, other
than an investment contract, "fits within any of the examples listed in the
statutory definition of 'security.' "92 The Court reasoned that application
of the Howey test in all circumstances would render superfluous the specific enumerations within the statutory definition of a security.93
In addition, the Court marshalled strong policy reasons for not applying the sale of business doctrine to sellers of businesses who effect the
sale through a stock transfer. According to the Court, application of the
sale of business doctrine to Landreth, and to cases in which less than 100
percent of the stock was sold, would require a determination of whether
control has passed to the purchaser. If control passes to the purchaser,
then according to sale of business doctrine adovcates, the stock transferred would not be a "security" under the Howey test. 94 Control is diffi88.Id.
89. Id. at 2303-05; see, e.g., Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982) (bank certificate of deposit and a privately negotiated profit sharing agreement not a "security");
United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975) (titular stock not a "security"); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967) (withdrawable capital shares in
a state savings and loan association termed a "security"); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.,
328 U.S. 293 (1946) (orange groves deemed "securities"); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943) (oil leases deemed "securities").
90. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 105 S. Ct. 2297, 2304 (1985).
91. Id. at 2305 n.5.
92. Id. at 2305.
93. Id. (citing Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139 (2d Cir. 1982) and Tcherepnin v.
Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967)). The Golden decision is particularly instructive because the issue was whether corporate stock constituted a "security." The court
stated: "If the 'economic reality' test were to be the core of the definition, only
general catch-all terms would have been used." Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139,
1144 (2d Cir. 1982); see also Prentice & Roszkowski, The Sale of Business Doctrine:
New Relief From Securities Regulation or a New Haven for Welshers?, 44 o.s. u. L.J.
473, 498-99 (1983) (arguing that Howey test should be applied only to an investment
contract).
94. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 105 S. Ct. 2297, 2307 (1985). The Court focused
on the district courts' onerous burden of engaging in meticulous factfinding regarding the passage of control and requesting supplemental facts on the control question
before deciding the case. Id. In Gould v. Ruefenacht, 105 S. Ct. 2308 (1985), the
companion case to Landreth, the Court manifested a deeper concern for the control
issue when less than 100 % of a company's stock is sold. In Gould, a case involving
the transfer of 50 % of a company's stock, the Court noted that control hinges on
variables such as voting rights, veto rights, or requirements for a super-majority
vote on corporate management issues. Id. at 2310-11. The key control factor works
to create even more nebulous inquiries because control can be gained by acquiring
less than 50 % of a company's stock. !d. at 2311. The fact finding chore would
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cult to determine and frequently can not be determined until the
completion of extensive factfinding. 95 The resulting uncertainty as to the
Acts' applicability would be antithetical to the best interest of both the
buyer and seller.96 To avoid this uncertainty, the Court held that stock is
not taken out of the ambit of the statutory definition of security merely
because control passes to the purchaser. 97
With respect to stock, the Landreth decision represents a clear resuscitation of the interpretation of the federal securities laws that existed
prior to Chandler v. Kew, Inc. 98 Before Chandler, cases considering the
sale of stock in a corporation routinely denominated the stock as a security for purposes of the Acts without examining a transaction's economic
realities. 99 The Chandler era, however, spawned a willingness by courts
to depart from a strict statutory framework to exclude transactions that
involve the sale of a business from coverage under the Acts. The Landreth opinion, marks the demise of those courts' mischaracterization of
"stock" to avoid the scope of the Acts. IOO
It is worth noting that Landreth expressly left untouched the question of whether "notes," "bonds," or "some other category of instrument
listed in the definition" are subject to federal securities laws in all circumstances. 101 In Landreth, the Court espoused significant policy considerations for finding that the stock transferred should come within the ambit
of the federal securities laws.102 The Court acknowledged that there
could be countervailing policy considerations for refraining from a strict

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

100.

101.
102.

become increasingly burdensome because resolution of the control issue requires
extensive inquiries into the innerworkings of each corporation to decipher whether
the purchase at issue gave the purchaser control. [d. at 2311. With the Gould opinion, the Supreme Court made it clear that the "sale of business doctrine" does not
apply to stock regardless of the quantity of stock transferred.
Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 105 S. Ct. 2297, 2307 (1985).
[d.
[d.
See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
See Spencer Co. v. Armark Indus., Inc. 489 F.2d 704 (1st Cir. 1973); Walling v.
Beverly Enter., 476 F.2d 393 (9th Cir. 1973); Chiodo v. General Waterworks Corp.,
380 F.2d 860 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 u.S. 1004 (1967); Matheson v. Armbrust,
284 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 870 (1961); Special Transp.
Servs., Inc. v. Baltimore, 325 F. Supp. 1185 (D. Minn. 1971).
For the Fourth Circuit, Landreth creates no change. The Fourth Circuit previously
had rejected the doctrine, interpreting Forman to mean that the "economic realities" test applies only after the typical characteristics of stock fail to answer to the
name appended. See Coffin v. Polishing Machines, Inc., 596 F.2d 1202, 1204 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979); see also Occidental Life Ins. Co. of North
Carolina v. Pat Ryan & Assoc., Inc., 496 F.2d 1255, 1261 (4th Cir. 1974) (decided
before Forman and applied a literal interpretation to the definition of "security.").
Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 105 S. Ct. 2297, 2306 (1985).
The Court's policy reasons involved the difficulty in ascertaining control, the linchpin of the "sale of business doctrine." The Court stated that line drawing would be
inevitable and every case would turn on ascertaining control. Landreth, 105 S. Ct. at
2307. Additionally, the Acts' coverage would be unknown to the parties transacting
business at sale time. [d. The Court also concluded that the slippery control factor
may not surface until after extensive discovery. !d. at 2308.
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literal approach to determine whether an instrument comes within the
Acts' protection. 103 Language in Landreth indicates that the Court perceives circumstances whereby other expressly enumerated instruments
could be excluded from the Acts' antifraud protection. 104 Thus, Landreth
in no way means that the sale of business doctrine, as applied to notes or
bonds for example,105 will not withstand judicial scrutiny.
The decision in Landreth implicates only the fraud liability of those
who seek to sell their business through a stock transfer. In reality, most
of a closely held corporation's transactions involve securities exempt
from the Acts' regulatory regime that requires the filing of a registration
statement, prospectus, and other informational requirements of federal
securities laws.106 From a business planning standpoint, however, the
Landreth decision alters strategy for those concerned with fraud liability.
If the Landreth Court had decided the sale of a business effected through
the transfer of stock was not a securities transaction, it would have made
no difference whether the sale of business was consummated through
stock or asset~ because, in either event, the legal recourse for a cause of
action based on fraud would be state law. Landreth makes it clear that a
sale of one's business through a stock transfer is a securities transaction.
Thus, litigation conscious individuals seeking to dispose of their business
now have a greater incentive to sell the company's assets to avoid possible liability under the Acts. By contrast, should fraud appear in a stock
transaction, the import of Landreth enables an aggrieved buyer to receive
his day in court in a federal forum.
The recrudescence of the literal interpretation of securities laws, at
103. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 105 S. Ct. 2297, 2306 n.7 (1985). The Court
stated:
It is therefore proper that we consider, in addition to the factors already
discussed, what may be described as policy considerations when we come
to flesh out the portions of the law with respect to which neither the congressional enactment nor the administrative regulations offer conclusive
guidance .... [I]t is proper for a court to consider - as we do today policy considerations in construing terms in these Acts.
Id. (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975)).
104. /d. The Court stated:
[N]ote[s] may now be viewed as a relatively broad term that encompasses
instruments with widely varying characteristics, depending on whether issued in a consumer context, as commercial paper, or in some other investment context. We here expressly leave until another day the question
whether 'notes' or 'bonds' or some other category of instrument listed in
the definition might be shown 'by proving [only] the document itself.' We
hold only that 'stock' may be viewed as being in a category by itself for
purposes of interpreting the scope of the Acts' definition of 'security.'
Id. at 2307.
105. For an excellent discussion of whether a note is a "security," see Note, The Economic Realities of Defining Notes As Securities Under the Securities Act of 1933 and
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 400 (1982).
106. R. HAMILTON, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 11 (1980) (NUTSHELL SERIES); Sargent, State Limited and Private Offering Exemptions: The Maryland Experience in a
National Perspective, 13 U. BALT. L. REV. 496, 505-11 (1984).
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least with respect to conventional stock, would make more sense if the
Landreth Court's reasoning had encapsulated more of the ingenious arguments for excluding federal protection when a business is sold. Conspicuously absent in the Court's election to adopt the literal approach is
the Court's failure to consider, as it did in Marine Bank, the vexatious
five word phrase, "unless the context otherwise requires," prefacing the
definition of security. 107 The Landreth Court was presented with the opportunity to interpret the meaning of this phrase but, instead, carefully
sidestepped the issue. As a result, Marine Bank will continue to foster
conjecture as to the applicability of that phrase to other instruments. lOS
Moreover, the Landreth Court's superficial analysis of the Acts' legislative history ignores a crucial distinction between investor and entrepreneur. Investors, according to Howey, rent capital and expect to profit
from the efforts of others. 109 The investor risks his capital in exchange for
a return commensurate with the risk taken. I 10 Entrepreneurs, however,
use capital that will enable them to be in business, and more significantly,
profit from the sweat of their own brow. The entrepreneur combines the
capital investment with management skills and innovative capabilities
that will be used to benefit and control the company in which the capital
is placed. I II This very real distinction is summarily dismissed by the
Landreth Court in its finding that the intent of certain provisions of the
1934 Act indicated that the Acts were intended to protect both the investor and the entrepreneur. I 12 Yet, the legislative enactments cited by the
107. This phrase is not foreign to statutes. It appears in 36 other Congressional statutes.
Brieffor Appellant, Appendix B, Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 105 S. Ct. 2297
(1985); see supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
108. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
109. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946).
110. Schneider, The Sale of a Business Doctrine - Another View, 37 Sw. L.J. 461, 487
(1983).
111. See Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197, 201-02 (7th Cir. 1982).
112. See Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 105 S. Ct. 2297, 2305 (1985). But see S. REP.
No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1934) (President Roosevelt's plea for enactment of
1934 Act to protect investors (emphasis supplied)); id. at 5 (report of the Senate
Committee on Banking and Currency describing the goal of the legislation as minimizing speculation and secrecy concerning corporations "which invited the public
to purchase their securities" (emphasis supplied)); id. at 4,6-7, 11-12 (Senate Committee's Report contains references to "disastrous results to investors" and "tremendous losses to the investing public" (emphasis supplied)); H.R. REP. No. 1838, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 32-33 (1934) (indicating interests of the investor, not those who
control a corporation, benefit from federal securities coverage); see also SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124 (1953) (purpose of 1933 Act "is to protect investors by promoting full disclosure of information"); SEC v. International Chern.
Dev. Corp., 469 F.2d 20, 26 (10th Cir. 1972) (purpose of Acts is "the protection of
investors from fraudulent practices"); Hanna & Turlington, Protection of the Public
Under the Securities Exchange Act, 21 VA. L. REV. 251, 276 (1935) (Acts' purpose
is to "improve the position of the average investor" (emphasis supplied)); Note, Legislation: The Securities Act of 1933,33 COLUM. L. REV. 1220, 1223 (1933) (purpose
is to enforce "disclosure to the investor of the elements necessary to insure an intelligent and informed jUdgment").
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Court 113 were intended as safeguards designed to protect the investor
from the quintessential strongarming that can occur when there exists a
separation of ownership and control. 114 Additionally, the Court's conclusion on this point precedes its acknowledgement that Justice Stevens, in
dissent,I15 correctly asserts that the legislative history is dead silent as to
transactions like the one in Landreth.I 16 The Court finesses the issue by
stating that its appropriate recourse is to add policy considerations to aid
the interpretation of legislative history} 17 The policy consideration was
to make both buyer and seller aware at the time of the sale of the business
that the transaction was covered by the Act, thereby eviscerating the importance of the control factor and, according to the Court, eviscerating
the concomitant laborious fact-finding mission that each court must engage in to divine the passage of control. 118
The Court in Landreth properly laid to rest the fiction that "stock"
is not a "security," and firmly established that the Howey test would be
applicable only to investment contracts. A much broader problem created by Landreth, however, is the Court's imprimatur upon aggrieved
buyers of closely held corporations, conducting their deals in typically
face-to-face fashion, to resolve their fraud claims in federal forums. This
policy issue, essentially a question of federalism, can be narrowed to
whether buyers of securities in a closely held corporation should be entitled to have the more favorable federal remedy of fraud rather than the
common law tort of fraud. Significantly, the latter remedy usually makes
omissions of fact unactionable. 119 If these potential plaintiffs deserve
113. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 105 S. Ct. 2297, 2305 (1985). The Court stated:
"The 1934 Act contains several provisions specifically governing tender offers, disclosure of transactions by corporate officers and principal stockholders, and the recovery of short-swing profits gained by such persons." Id.
114. With respect to tender offers, disclosure requirements were enacted so that shareholders can decide with prescience whether or not to tender their shares. See HENN
& ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS 820 (3d ed. 1983). Regarding the statutory prohibitions against insider trading, section 16(b) of the 1934 Act provides that
a director, officer, or ten percent beneficial owner who purchases and sells, or sells
and purchases the stock of his corporation within a period of less than six months is
liable to the corporation for any profits obtained. 15 V.S.c. § 78p(b) (1982). Commentators have concluded that the thrust of section 16 is to protect the investor
from those running the company. See, e.g., Cook & Feldman, Insider Trading
Under the Securities Exchange Act (pts 1-2),66 HARV. L. REV. 612, 641 (1953) ("It
is to be expected that [section 16] will continue to be an important and secure link in
the armor protecting the public investor."); Rubin & Feldman, Statutory Inhibitions
upon Unfair Use of Corporate Information by Insiders, 95 V. PA. L. REV. 468, 468
(1947) ("The invidious character of such trading is emphasized by the fact that the
profit so obtained by the managers was not disclosed to the real owners of the corporation, to wit, the stockholders, and because it was often obtained at their
expense. ").
115. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 105 S. Ct. 2297, 2312-13 (1985) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
116. Id. at 2306 n.7.
117. /d.
118. See supra notes 94-97 and accompapying text.
119. See Long, Don't Forget the Securities Acts!, 26 OKLA. L. REV. 160, 181 (1973)
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more protection than common law fraud provides, the appropriate remedy then would be to enact a state law parallel to rule lOb-5. It makes no
sense for federal forums to be forced to deal with the kinds of problems
that involve close corporation shares that are rarely traded. These
problems are better left to state securities laws or state common law
fraud. Moreover, making rule lOb-5 applicable to the close corporation
contravenes the rule's purpose, which is to protect the investor investing
in public securities. 120 Relying on the rule's purpose, commentators have
argued that rule lOb-5 and the other federal antifraud rules do not belong
amid the affairs of closely held companies because close corporation
shares are infrequently traded. 121 Because Landreth dismissed the novel
argument that a closely held corporation's stock, when used to transfer
ownership and control, is not a security, it is incumbent upon Congress
to exempt transactions involving the sale of a closely held corporation
negotiated face-to-face from rule lOb-5. Congress first must make the determination that abatement of federal regulation in this area is necessary,
that rule lOb-5 need not "cover the corporate universe," and that regulation is better left to the state regulatory mechanism. Congress should
then pick up where the "sale of business doctrine" left off and render the
federal antifraud rules inapplicable to the closely held corporation. This
legislative action would serve to end the unnecessary intrusion by the
federal government into matters better resolved by the states.
In sum, Landreth provides a much needed clarification of the applicability of the sale of business doctrine and the applicability of the Howey
test to instruments other than investment contracts. The practical realities, however, of Landreth beg Congressional action to exclude from federal antifraud protection a stock transfer involving the sale of a closely
held corporation.

Jeff Cook

("[T]he question of whether common law fraud will cover omissions as well as
fraudulent statements is eliminated. It is clear from the language of ... the Federal
Acts that one cannot escape liability by failing to disclose material information. ").
120. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663,
700 (1974). Professor Cary, an ardent supporter offederal securities regulation, said
in regard to rule lOb-5: "It seems anomalous to jigsaw every kind of corporate
dispute into the federal courts through the securities acts as they are presently written." Id.
121. E.g., Latty, The Aggrieved Buyer or Seller or Holder of Shares in a Close Corporation
Under the S.E.C. Statutes, 18 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 505 (1953); Mofsky, Some
Comments on the Expanding Definition of "Security. " 27 U. MIAMI L. REV. 395
(1973); Ratner, Federal and State Roles in the Regulation of Insider Trading, 31
Bus. LAW. 947 (1976); Note, A New Approach to Rule JOb-5: Distinguishing the
Close Corporation, 1978 WASH. U.L.Q. 733.

